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''The fully employed high income society'': 
a comment 
John Robinson* 
An April 1990 Planning Council report The fully employed high income society, by 
Dennis Rose has received nationwide publicity due to its suggestion that full 
employment is possible by 1995. The suggestion that full employment is possible 
within 5 years is based on several model experiments. In this paper I examine the 
calculations on which these assertions are based, and conclude that they are not supported; 
indeed the modelling indicates the very opposite of what is claimed - full employment by 
1995 is next to impossible following current policies. 
1. The major conclusions of the report 
The major conclusions of the report are the first three items in the "Conclusion" list 
of p.38: 
- Labour force forecasts suggest that New Zealand needs to increase 
employment by an average annual rate of close to 2.5 percent if it is to 
return to full employmenl by 1995. 
- The model suggests that faster rates of productivity increase will provide the 
fundamental basis for competitive expansions in output, employment and 
• 1ncome. 
- Thus, a doubling in sectoral rates of productivity increase (from those in 
Prospects) could lead, by 1995, to full employment and to a level of GDP 15 
percent higher than suggested in the base line medium-let m forecasts. 
The reference to Prospects is to a 1988 Planning Council report by the National 
Sectoral Programme with Dennis Rose as convenor (New Zealand Planning Council, 
1988). The modelling of the later report has used the Prospects modelling as a base, and 
adjusted the input parameters to generate more optimistic forecasts. The models used in 
the two linked reports are SDMACRO, a system-dynamics macroeconomic model of the 
New Zealand economy; and JULIANNE, a non-linear general-equilibrium model, 
developed and run at the Project on Economic Planning, Victoria University. 
2. Required increases in employment 
Since the discussion takes the 1988 Prospects forecasts as a base, it is important to 
fust note the forecasts of employment changes made there, and to compare the forecasts 
with the measured values. Employment is measured in full time equivalents derived from 
Technology Monitoring Associates, Martinborough. 
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the March Household Labour Force Survey, with one part-time worker taken as the 
equivalent of half a full timer ( New Zealand Planning Council, 1988, p.63). Since the 
values provided by the Department of Statistics do not correspond exactly with those of 
the Planning Council reports, changes in employment are compared over the two-year 
periods 1986-88 and 1988-90. 
The 1988 forecast of Prospects commence in 1986, giving values of 1,391,000 in 
1986, 1,415,000 in 1988 and 1,429,000 in 1990 (New Zealand Planning Council, 1988, 
infogram A3.1, p.91). Values of full and part time employment provided by the 
Department of Statistics for the March Household Labour Force Surveys indicate full 
time equivalents of 1,424,000 in 1986, 1,393,000 in 1988 and 1,334,000 in 1990. 
Thus, even at the time of publication of this 1988 report the model was forecasting an 
employment increase of 24,000 over the previous two years when in fact employment 
had dropped by 31,000. Subsequently the model has forecast a further employment 
increase of 14,000 in 1988-90 whereas employment actually dropped by 59,000. Thus 
over the 4 years 1986-88 (a significant period for such modelling) the model suggested an 
increase in employment of 38,000, whereas the actual experience was of a fall of 90,000. 
The actual contraction in the job market is dismissed in the Fully employed high 
income society as follows: 
Events to date have been worse than forecast. Employment has fallen sharply 
over a period in wh.ich Prospects suggested a small increase. Participation rates 
have also fallen. At this stage we have assumed these are short-term resJX>nses 
to adverse conditions, and the Prospects forecasts are used to give an idea of the 
necessary growth in employment (Rose, 1990, p.2). 
The 1990 report repeats the process of commencing calculations 2 years in the past, 
and ignoring the real-life drop in employment. The analysis of employment increases 
required to give "full" employment [defined as 2 percent "frictional" employment (Rose 
1990, p.2)] is based on the statement that the actual 1988 employment of 1,357,000 
must be increased to 1,590,000 by the year 1995. This requires 33,000 new jobs a year, 
an increase at a rate of 2.3 percent per annum (Rose 1990, p.3 and infograrn 1). This rate 
of increase is given as 2.5 percent in the conclusions (Rose, 1990, p.38). The difference 
between the 2 values noted is minimal and need not concern us here. The forecast and 
observed employment changes are summarised in table 1. 
Table 1: Employment changes 
Period Prospects 1988 
Forecasts 
Rose 1990 
Forecasts 
Observed 
1986-88 
1988-90 
24,000 
14,000 
-31,000 
66,000 -59,000 
If the actual drop off in employment is taken into account, it is found that in order to 
create "full" employment by 1995, starting from the present, 1990, then 292,000 jobs 
must be created in 5 years - rather than 233,000 jobs in 7 years. This requires the 
creation of 58,400 jobs per year (not 33,000), an increase at a rate of 4.3 percent per year 
(not 2.3 percent or 2.5 percent). The statement, in the conclusions, of the number of 
jobs required depends on deliberately ignoring recent job losses, and requiring job creation 
to commence 2 years in the past. The first conclusion, that employment growth at an 
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annual rate of 2.5 percent is needed if full employment is to be achieved by 1995, docs 
not hold true in 1990. 
3. The modelling time-span 
The third claim of the conclusion is that 
a doubling in sectoral rates of productivity increase (from those in Prospects) 
could lead, by 1995, to full employment and to a level of GOP 15 percent higher 
than suggested in the base line medium-term forecasts (Rose, 1990, p.38). 
This would seem to indicate a doubling of productivity over the remaining 5-year 
period, 1990-95. However, as the following quotes make clear, the modelling 
commences in 1984 and covers an 11-year time span. 
A doubling of the annual rate of productivity increase from 1 to 2 percent 
(sustained in the model run over an eleven-year period) would dramatically alter 
the competitiveness of New Zealand production by reducing the amounts of 
labour and capital required to produce any particular level of output (Rose, 1990, 
p.4 ). 
The projections are 
made from two linked models based in the mid 1980s over the span to 1994/95. 
The early years of that period are already history, but are not part of the written 
record avail able to the models (Rose. 1990. p.l6 ). 
The scale of this increase in GDP is. at flrst sight, surprising. It is less so when 
recognised that the model spans an eleven-year period. The annual differences 
in productivity gains compound to an 11 percent increase (Rose, 1990, p.l7). 
4. Manipulating the model - and changes ih capital stock 
The model is not however then left to follow those specifications alone, and to 
explore the consequences so far as employment is concerned. Rather, the model is 
instructed to reduce unemployment to the required figure. 
Because some part of the increase in productivity is likely to result from 
innovations embodied in new equipment, buildings and systems, it is assumed 
that the capital stock available in Lhe future reference year - 1995 - is 5 percent 
higher than in the Prospects forecast. This requires a significant lift in capital 
formation, given that we arc now more than half way from the model's 1984 
base to the 1995 "snapshot" year. Fina1ly, the model is told to reduce the 
unemployment rate to 2 percent of the available work force (Rose, 1990, p.l7). 
Much of the presentation suggests that the increase in capital stock is secondary to 
the productivity improvements. Thus, for example, the list of conclusions includes: 
The model runs suggest that higher rates of investment would, by enlarging the 
nation's capital stock, and provided the investn1cnts were well chosen, make it 
easier to expand economic activ1ty and employment (Rose, 1990, p.38). 
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However, the increases in capital stock do not just "make it easier" to generate full 
employment, rather the complete increase in employment is generated from the increased 
capital alone. 
In the model run just reported it was assumed that a doubling of sectoral 
productivity growth rates would require an increase in the capital stock 
available in the scenario year, and thus was arbitrarily set 5 percent above the 
levels that would otherwise prevail. The earlier run thus combines the effect of 
increased productivity and higher levels of capital. 
The model was then used to sketch the outcome of an increase in the capital 
stock without a parallel doubling in the rate of technical change. This 
intermediate sketch helps to assess the relative strength of the two changes ..... 
The results are quite dramatic, as are the contrasts between the two variant runs. 
The first point to note is that the model was required to move to 'full 
employment' between the Prospects and 'higher capital stock' runs. 
Employment thus increases by 100 percent of the full increase secured by the 
combined influence of capital and productivity ..... In this run full employment 
is being secured without any significant shift in real incomes, solely through 
an expansion in the capital stock. The mechanism is clear enough. The 
required increase in employment is equivalent to 4.2 percent of the Prospects 
leveL If by 1995 our capital stock was 5 percent larger than in Prospects, and 
provided that investment had been well placed in profitable uses, then there 
should in principle be little problem in providing additional employment in 
about the same proportion (Rose, 1990, p.19). 
The output of reduced unemployment is not then a consequence of the modelling, but 
rather a requirement which was fed in at the outset. The model simply does what is told. 
It is clear that the model "was required" to give full employment by an "arbitrary" change 
in capital formation, with no change in productivity. It is then incorrect to claim that the 
productivity change will lead to such an employment increase. 
There is liule discussion of this arbitrary increase in capital formation, other than the 
comment that: "Given the low levels of investment in recent years, annual investment 
has to lift markedly from now on to support the required $8 billion increase in capital 
s tocks" (Rose, 1990, p.l8). 
The increase in capital formation which has been associated with the productivity 
increase points to some confusion concerning just what is meant by "productivity". 
Productivity is generally a residual factor, being what is left when the impacts of changes 
in labour and capital have been removed in a model formulation. It is a term which 
represents all those various factors which cannot be ascribed to readily measured labour 
and capital. 
Productivity growth, technical change, and total factor productivity (fFP) arc 
oflcn seen as interchangeable terms describing that proportion of real output 
growth which comes from increased efficiency in the use of labour and capital 
inputs ( New Zealand Planning Council. 1988, p.33). 
Measures of productivity (p), and of changes in productivity, are generated with the 
use of an appropriate formula relating output (Q) to the labour force employed (L) and the 
capital stock (C). Thus, 
Q = f(p) g(L,C) 
This may take the form 
Q = f(p) La ci-a, 
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and, if the productivity function is increasing at constant rate with time, 
Q =A exp(cp) La ci-a. 
This was the formula used at OECD lnterfutures. 
The impact of any change in productivity is then separate from changes due to capital 
formation. This can be seen in the Prospects figure illustrating the forecasting process 
(New Zealand Planning Council, 1988, p.8), where "capital stocks" and "technical 
change" are input quite separately into the JULLIANNE model. 
The change in capital stock was an additional and independent exogenous change to 
the model run, and should have been clearly referenced as such. In this respect the 
headings on the charts (Rose, 1990) are significant, since it is only on infogram 6 that 
the heading for this run is "higher capital and productivity"; in other infograms the 
combined run is referred to under the heading "higher productivity" (as, for example, 
info grams 5 and 10, both of which note the considerable increases in employment which 
were in fact generated by the higher capital). This conveys the incorrect message to the 
reader that the changes in employment have been generated by the modelling of 
productivity. The second conclusion, that faster rates of productivity increase will 
provide the fundamental basis for competitive expansions in employment, is not 
supported by such modelling. 
5. Improving productivity 
Modelling should make use of parameters which are realistic and relate to historical 
experience. It is of little real value to force a model to produce some required result by 
the exogenous introduction of unreasonable assumptions. The productivity changes 
introduced in the modelling may be compared with the annual rates of change of total 
factor productivity for New Zealand in the recent past (Rose, 1990, p.5 infogram 2). 
These are as follows: 
1960s to 1973 
1973-79 
1979-86 
whole period 
0.6 percent 
-2.5 percent 
0.6 percent 
-0.1 percent 
A check on the extraordinary modeJling technique of starting 6 years in the past and 
requiring retrospective increases in productivity may be obtained from data reported in 
infogram 5 (Rose, 1990, p.18). The total factor productivity in 1995 is 1.093 in the 
Prospects run (which, as we have noted above, has proved to be over-optimistic) and 
1.210 in the "higher productivity" run. The flfst figure of 1.093 is a compounded annual 
rate of 0.81 percent over 11 years and the second figure of 1.210 is a compounded annual 
rate of 1.75 percent over 11 years. These numbers arc close to the "doubling of the 
annual rate of productivity increase from 1 to 2 percent" referenced in the text. 
If the Prospects productivity increase of 0.81 percent per year is assumed for the 
period up to the present (an already unrealistic assumption), then in order to generate the 
required increase in productivity of 1.210 by 1990, the annual rate of productivity increase 
must be 2.86 percent for the remaining 5 years of the modelling 11-ycar time span. 
Whereas a 1.75 percent annual rate (generating an increase by a factor of 1.210 in 11 
years) is some 3 times the recent New Zealand rates (the relatively high rate of 0.6 
percent for 1979-86, see above), a 2.86 percent annual rate of productivity increase is 
almost 5 times that recent, observed value. 
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6. The experience of the manufacturing sector 
The manufacturing sector in New Zealand has collapsed in recent years. Between 
December 1985 and December 1989, the number of males employed has declined by 20 
percent (from 217,300 to 173,800) and the number of females employed has declined by 
25 percent (from 102,800 to 76,700). Hours worked in manufacturing dropped by 16.8 
percent; from 538,357 in the March year 1985 to 452,265 in the March year 1989 
(Department of Statistics 1990). An alternative measure of employment, from the 
Quarterly Employment Survey, which counts all those working in establishments which 
employ more than 2 full time equivalent paid employees, gave a drop in employment in 
manufacturing of 10,800 or 4.1 percent in the year to August 1990 (The Evening Post, 
17 August 1990). 
However the 2 reports model increasing employment in manufacturing from 1984 
into the future. The 1988 Prospects (New Zealand Planning Council, 1988, infogram 
6.1 0) has annual employment growth rates in manufacturing of 0.5 percent for 1984-92 
and 0.9 percent for 1992-97. The 1990 report (Rose 1990, infogram I 0) has an even 
higher increase in employment in manufacturing: from 1983/4 to 1994/95 the "higher 
productivity" run suggests an increase of 37,500 jobs in manufacturing, which is 9,900 
more than the over-optimistic Prospects forecast. The Planning Council modelling 
simply reverses the observed trends. 
I find this modelling of particular interest since, in 1981, I forecast the observed 
decline in manufacturing production in New Zealand following trade liberalisation using a 
global computer model, SARUM (referred to below) (Robinson 1981). One model 
experiment forecast that the proiXJrtion of machinery provided from local production could 
increase from around 75 percent in 1980 to 90 percent with less trade, but could decrease 
to around 15 percent by the year 2010 with more trade. These model runs included rather 
optimistic economic growth parameters; the output in physical units of machinery was 
forecast to double with less trade, and to almost halve with more trade. Another model 
experiment explored the consequences of free trade with Australia (such as CER). 
Whereas the forecast (again with somewhat optimistic economic growth assumptions) 
was for a 60 percent increase of employment in manufacturing with isolation, free trade 
• 
reduced the increase to 16 percent. 
The model suggested clearly that the New Zealand manufacturing sector would suffer 
under a policy of free trade, and that is exactly what has happened. With an appropriate 
model (which mirrors the real world), and with proper regard to existing trends, it is 
possible to gain some understanding of the macroeconomic trends which define the New 
Zealand economic experience. 
The Planning Council's modelling of productivity in the manufacturing sector is not 
based on recent experience. Instead: 
Forecast rates of change in total factor productivity for the manufacturing sector 
were drawn from the New Zealand Manufacturers' Federation survey undertaken 
as part of the consultation process. Participants were asked to estimate 
increases in capital and labour required for a 20% and a 50% rise in output, and 
these were used to cstrmate TFP (New Zealand Planning Counctl, 1988, p.39). 
The meaning of such productivity change estimates is hard to grasp. Would 
productivity changes which have been based on the assumption of increased output 
simply automatically repeat such output increases when fed into a model? How do such 
estimates relate to a future world of increased employment (as forecast) when a key factor 
in recent gains in productivity is the shedding of labour? (New Zealand Planning Council, 
1988, p.39). Certainly the resultant forecasts of expansion in the manufacturing sector 
have proved to be quite the op{X)site of the observed behaviour. 
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Reliance on opinion surveys is a dubious methodology for the forecasting of medium 
or long term trends. This may be a case of the blind leading the blind. Historically, 
business confidence has often proved a very poor guide to future events. Thus, for 
example, a period of pessimism in 1920-23 was followed by a period of economic 
growth. That growth engendered excessive optimism up to the time of the stock market 
crash of 1929 (Robinson 1990, pp.l 02-103 ). Both the initial pessimism and the 
following euphoria proved poor guides to the medium term prospects. Similarly, the 
recent (1987) stock market crash was preceded by a period of general optimism. 
7. Multiple parameter changes in modelling 
The sketch of future trends is rcfcned to as a scenario in the foreword to the report 
(Rose 1990) and in a Planning Council summary of the report (New Zealand Planning 
Council, 1990). The mixed approach combines discussion, survey and discussion 
indications of productivity forecasts (in Prospects), non-model calculations and modelling 
using 2 medium-term models of the economy. 
The models arc linked in their usc, and several parameter changes arc made between 
the key model runs (a<; noted above). These arc complex models, with a theoretical base 
and behavioural structure which arc a mystery to most readers. I have noted on many 
occasions that the complex models which arc made possible by the use of modem 
computational capabilities arc often used as black-box propaganda tools . If this is to be 
avoided, the determinant mechanisms should be clear to the average discerning reader 
(Robinson, 1990, p.I16). I believe that the modelling of this report fails such a test. 
This is in part due to the multiple parameter changes between the Pro.~pecls base run 
(itself neither clear nor of any certain relevance) and the "higher capital and productivity" 
run. Without a very careful reading of the text, the reader may not understand the relative 
importance of the various parameter changes; this is particularly so -v. hen, as in the 
present case, the report makes assertions which arc not based on the actual modelling. 
This confusion between the impacts of different parameter changes is a constant danger in 
this approach to scenario analysis, as I have noted from my experience with the OECD 
Intcrfutures project. 
"OECD Interfutures carried out similar runs using the [SARUM] model, but set 
their model experiments within a scenario structure which blurred the message 
somewhat." Scenarios which described free trade and protectiOnism were 
modelled using 2 exogenous changes to input paratneters. Increased trade 
biases and lower economic growth rates were introduced as endogenous change.." 
in the free trade (self sufficiency for the developing countries) model run. Free 
trade was then associated with poorer economic performance, but this was not 
an output generated by the workings of the model. rather it was a direct 
consequence of the changes to input parameters. "This was not a fair test of the 
model as far as trade policy alone is concerned" (Robinson 1990, p.l33). 
The model referred to here, the Systems Analysis Research Unit ~1odcl (SARUM) 
was used by Systems Analysis Research Unit staff to generate son1c most useful 
information, by varying one parameter at a tin1c in order to carefully test son1c definite 
policy change, and to determine the resultant behaviour as described by the model 
(Robinson, 1990). I believe that such careful model experiments, involving one 
parameter change at a time, provide the best means of enriching a scenario analysis with 
the aid of complex computer models. Indeed, it is the description of the relative 
imJX)rtance of the parameter changes in the "Increased investrnent" section of the report 
(Rose, 1990) which tells us that the entire employment growth is generated solely by the 
increased invesuncnt, and not by productivity in1provement.s. 
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8. Conclusions from the modelling 
A careful reading of the 2 reports has established the following points: 
(a) Estimates of e mploy ment requirements commenced in 1988 and ignored the 
significant loss of jobs between that date and the present. 
(b) Modelling of productivity increases commenced with modelling which has proved 
unrealistic and overly optimistic, and assumed a further doubling of productivity. 
(c) The model run commenced in 1984 with these increases in productivity in order to 
generate an opumistic result in 1995, thus ignoring the negative experiences of 1984-
90. 
(d) The model was instructed to prod uce full employment by 1995 - this was not a 
consequence of the modelling based on policy changes as represented by input 
parameters. 
(c) Full employment was completely generated by additional capital investment. 
To suggest that such modelling indicates the possibility of full employment by 1995 
starting from the real New Zealand of 1990 is nonsense. 
The model runs, when compared to actual experience, have shown clearly that full 
employment by 1995 is next to impossible, requiring an unbelievable reversal of trends, 
considerable additional capital investment and unbelievable increases in productivity. 
This is the unavoidable conc lusion which must be reached from the modelling; the 
conclusions of the report are simply unprofessional wishful thinking. 
9. The Planning Council programme - "sustainable full 
employment with high incomes" 
The optimism of this modelling, compared to the observed reality, is common to 
Planning Council forecasts (Haywood 1980, Haywood and Cavana, 1986). I have noted 
previously (Robinson, 1988, p.l 04 and fig 10; Robinson, 1990, p.1 29) that: 
Official forecasts usually reflect the blind wishful thinking of the time - the 
successful, long lasting organisation will not b1te the hand that feeds it. The 
New Zealand Planning Council, for example, regularly provides forecasts of 
unemployment v.hich briefly follow the rising observed lrend before levelling 
off, declining, and disappeanng wtthm about a decade A few years later, 
unemployment in the real world has gone up. So they repeat the exercise, each 
time neglecting to present a graph showing the lack of agreement between any 
previous forecast and what has transpired. If they did, it would look just like an 
imaginative fireworks display, with the hopeful forecasts falling away to zero 
each time, but v.- 1th the real world unemployment persistently mounting. I, 
along with others, saw m around 1976 that unemployment would be a feature of 
W es tern economtes for a long t1me yet, but even up to the present time (13 
years later in 1989) polillctans continue to treat joblessness as a temporary 
phenomenon, replacing one stopgap scheme with another, and relreating to 
tautologies in which higher economic growth 1s called for in order to get the 
country back on its feet again. Many lives have been broken by this foolish 
and wilful ignorance as the blind lead the blind deeper into depression 
(Robinson, 1990, p 129). 
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The tone of the introduction by Planning Council Chairman, Gary Hawke, and much 
of the discussion of the report itself, is dogmatic and ideological. The conclusion of this 
exercise in macroeconomics throws the onus of improvement onto the individual. Thus, 
for example, the s ummary states that "The return to full employment requires a 
commitment, and action, from each and all of us" (New Zealand Planning Council, 
1990). I do not believe that the serious national economic situation is best dealt with by 
such exhortations to the many individuals who feel powerless in the face of 
overwhelming economic forces. This smacks of the growing tendency to blame the 
victim rather than to face squarely the need for appropriate collec tive action. It represents 
an abrogation of responsibility by national policy-makers. 
Hawke states that: "This report by Dennis Rose is a key clement in a major 
Planning Council programme to secure commitment by New Zealanders to achieving 
sustainable full employment with high incomes" (Rose, 1990, Foreward). The manner 
in which unjustified conclusions have been drawn from the modelling must raise serious 
concern regarding the purpose and value of the Planning Council programme. 
It has been suggested to me that the report has a certain value in that it chooses to 
"think positive", and follows an optimistic approach which insists (whether or not the 
facts support the contention) that full employment can be achieved. That attitude 
suggests further that pessimistic realism may be in accord with the facts, but is not very 
productive. 
As a scientist, I believe that modelling should provide a realistic representation of the 
real world. A model must fit observed data before reaching conclusions or making 
forecasts of expected happenings; and the model must then be judged by the success or 
failure of such forecasts. Only then will modelling provide useful understanding and 
guidance. If those of us who thought, in the mid-1970s, that unemployment was a long 
term feature of modern developed societies had been lis tened to, perhaps policy would 
have been developed to face the problem squarely and to develop solutions. Instead of 
this, it has been continually wished away. 
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